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Vassiliki Betty Smocovitis, Unifying Biology: The Evolutionary Synthesis
and Evolutionary Biology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996),
xxiv + 230 pp., $29.95.
Unifying Biology offers an important new interpretation of the evolutionary
synthesis from the perspective of cultural studies of science. Based on an
article of the same name, which appeared in the Journal of the History of
Biology (25 [1992]: 1–65), Unifying Biology recasts the evolutionary
synthesis as a unifying narrative. Where other scholars have tried to understand the synthesis in terms of the articulation of a neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the creation of a new field, or the negotiation of the interests
of groups of geneticists, systematists, and paleontologists, Smocovitis argues
that the evolutionary synthesis and science in general should be understood as
“narrative-constituted practice” (p. 206). The narrative of Unifying Biology is
meant to provide an interpretive framework for the synthesis that sheds light
on “the history and organization of the discipline of evolutionary biology” and
on “the growing belief that evolution unified the modern biological sciences”
(p. xviii).
Unifying Biology is divided into three sections; the narrative interpretation of the synthesis is framed by an extended discussion of the historical,
philosophical, and scientific contexts at the beginning and a discussion of the
implications of the narrative at the end. Because it was written for a variety
of readers ranging from scientists to scholars engaged in cultural studies,
the introduction to Unifying Biology may seem to cover familiar ground for
readers of the Journal of the History of Biology. While most historians probably do not need a lesson on how to closely read the narrative (pp. 10–16), the
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detailed review of the historiography of the synthesis presented in chapters 2
and 3 offers a clear and insightful overview of the variety of different perspectives that have been brought to bear on this “moving target.” Smocovitis’s
discussion in chapter 3 of different approaches to the question of what pulled
biologists together during the synthesis is especially valuable for understanding why she privileges narrative over more traditional internalist or externalist
approaches to the history of science. For instance, Smocovitis argues that the
fact that evolutionary biology as a discipline was never administratively legitimated as a university department in the United States cannot be explained by
an externalist “interest” model of science (p. 68). Yet by turning to narrative,
she does not want to reduce the synthesis to its rhetoric and discourse (pp. 71–
72). Smocovitis’s goal is to create a coherent narrative that takes the practices
of individual scientists seriously and combines their personal narratives with
social, political, philosophical, and disciplinary narratives (pp. 74, 92).
Any account of the evolutionary synthesis has to take into account the role
of its “architects”: Theodosius Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr, and G. G. Simpson.
The “architects” are at the core of Smocovitis’s narrative, but the way they
are contextualized is crucial. Smocovitis places the “architects” in a positivist
tradition concerning the unity of science. Accepting the drive to unify science
raised questions for biologists such as J. H. Woodger and H. S. Jennings about
the status of biology: How could it be unified and yet remain autonomous
from physics and chemistry? The process of articulating that evolution was
what unified biology was grounded on Dobzhansky’s evolutionary genetics,
published in 1937 as Genetics and the Origin of Species. The response to
Dobzhansky’s book in Mayr’s Systematics and the Origin of Species (1942),
Simpson’s Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944), and G. Ledyard Stebbin’s
Variation and Evolution in Plants (1950) is interpreted as amending, reinterpreting, and legitimating Dobzhansky’s evolutionary genetics framework.
While Dobzhansky’s evolutionary genetics is taken to have bound “together
the heterogeneous practices of the biological sciences,” Smocovitis argues
that the significance of evolution as a unifier in biology was brought to a wider
audience by Julian Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. Huxley’s
advocacy of progressive evolution and his willingness to draw out its implications for the unity and autonomy of biology, as well as for liberal ideology and
humanism, allow Smocovitis to significantly broaden her narrative beyond
Dobzhansky’s evolutionary genetic framework. Even as the new discipline
of evolutionary biology was institutionalized, Huxley and later Dobzhansky
extended evolution to human society and politics. For Smocovitis, this evolutionary humanism is indicative of the commitment to a unifying narrative
that will literally explain the meaning of life (pp. 152–153, 215). Framing the
evolutionary synthesis with Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin of Species
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at the beginning and his Mankind Evolving near its end persuasively refigures
the cultural meaning of the evolutionary synthesis.
As a polemic for understanding biology as “narrative-constituted
practice,” Unifying Biology is going to be controversial. Smocovitis argues
that “not all narratives will do,” yet the grounds for discriminating among
different possibilities are not clearly articulated (pp. 206–207). Moreover,
Smocovitis’s emphasis on constructing a “meaningful story on the discipline
level” allows her to disengage from the “causal” influences between individuals doing evolutionary biology (p. 204). I agree that the trajectory of
the “collective enterprise” of seeking a unified biology and unified knowledge need not map onto the “specific positions” of all of the individuals
involved, but Smocovitis’s account raises serious questions about the relationship between the cultural history presented in her narrative and the history of
the “causal” interactions among individual scientists. If judging the history
of “causal” interactions among individuals is sometimes difficult, judging
among different narratives appears much more problematic.
As a framework for understanding the synthesis, Smocovitis’s narrative
brings order to a very complex process. Although presented as narrative, the
account does not preclude more traditional approaches to the synthesis. The
narrative framework of Unifying Biology raises a wealth of questions to be
explored further, such as, in what sense were disciplines such as embryology,
ecology, and microbiology part of the synthesis? Or, put another way, why
were these disciplines written out of the narrative? Understanding the
synthesis as a unifying process also raises questions about how belief in a
unified science might have influenced the interactions of individual scientists. These kinds of considerations are especially significant in evaluating
the status of “outsiders” such as Richard Goldschmidt or Otto Schindewolf,
the way in which the Society for the Study of Evolution was run, and the way
in which Evolution was edited.
Unifying Biology is a provocative reinterpretation of a centrally important
episode in the history of biology. While written to stimulate discussion among
a wide audience, the work is a challenge to historians of biology to rethink
both the evolutionary synthesis itself and how the history of the synthesis
should be written in the future. As such, Unifying Biology deserves careful
consideration by anyone interested in the history of evolutionary biology.
Michael R. Dietrich

292

THE J. H. B. BOOKSELF

Diane B. Paul, Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1995), xii + 158 pp., illus.,
$39.95, $12.50 paper.
Marouf A. Hasian, Jr., The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), x + 265 pp., $40.00.
What was “eugenics” and why does it matter? Two new books address these
questions by examining the scientific movement christened by Francis Galton
from a Greek root meaning “wellborn.” Both explicate the multiple meanings
and diverse political arguments that came to be associated with this movement. Both also consider the significance of this history for the field now
called medical genetics.
Diane B. Paul’s text, Controlling Human Heredity, surveys the intertwining of scientific theories and political philosophies that shaped the study of
heredity from Darwin’s day to the present. Part of a series exploring the
“control of nature” written for general readers, its goal is to “bridge the gap
between expert and lay understandings” (p. 21) by presenting contemporary
historical scholarship in a concise and accessible manner. The result is a
clearly written study rich in scientific and moral complexity that not only
summarizes recent literature but also adds to it.
Paul challenges several still-popular oversimplifications, such as that
“eugenicists were all political reactionaries who held scientific views that
were obviously preposterous” (p. 18), or that this movement’s demise was
largely due to the progress of science and the emergence of “real” genetics.
Instead, she documents a diverse movement that appealed to revolutionaries
as well as reactionaries, and that captured the imagination of feminists,
Fabians, progressives, national socialists, social democrats, and countless
others. Some episodes recounted here will be familiar, such as the efforts of
American eugenicists to restrict immigration; others are far less known, such
as leftist geneticist H. J. Muller’s efforts to convince Stalin that a program
of artificial insemination could help the Soviet Union produce men of genius.
Particularly suggestive is Paul’s comparison of eugenics in Germany and
Denmark. By the 1930s, both countries had passed strict sterilization laws.
Yet in Germany, these laws were ultimately linked to broader Nazi policies promoting euthanasia, racial hatred, and genocide, while in Denmark
they were largely associated with a markedly different sort of collectivist
enterprise – the liberal welfare state.
Even more significant than these diverse political uses are the convergences Paul identifies in explicating the “commonsense” beliefs guiding
much eugenic science – beliefs that frequently persisted even when genetic
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findings contradicted them. Among these, for example, was the belief that
sterilization could dramatically reduce the incidence of hereditary conditions
such as “feeblemindedness” in one or two generations – perhaps by as much
as 50 percent. As early as 1917, Paul notes, geneticists had seen the flaw
in such arguments, for if feeblemindedness were truly a recessive trait,
sterilizing the afflicted would hardly reduce the far larger number of carriers.
Applying the Hardy-Weinberg formula, geneticist R. C. Punnett concluded
that even if none of the feebleminded reproduced, if would take 8,000 years
to reduce the incidence of this condition to one in 100,000. Yet such findings did not lead these scientists to oppose sterilization; instead, they simply
defended this practice for its social utility. The same logic is evident in
writings on “miscegenation.” While most Americans believed that “racemixing” led to degeneration, genetic research often suggested the opposite,
for Charles Davenport, Edward East, and William Castle all thought that
“outbreeding” might actually increase “vigor” and the chances of heritable
variations. Yet such findings did not lead these geneticists to challenge popular prejudices. To the contrary, Davenport wrote that a “group of white
people will always be led by its instincts to segregate itself from Negroes,
Chinese, and other groups,” East believed that blacks and whites constituted
too wide a racial cross, and Castle argued that such crossing “interferes with
social inheritance” and was therefore best avoided (pp. 111–113). It would
take the widespread public revulsion at Nazi atrocities, and not the findings
of geneticists, Paul concludes, to begin to undermine these “commonsense”
assumptions.
Equally significant in undermining eugenic arguments would be another
political development – the modern women’s movement. In defending birth
control in the 1960s and abortion rights in the 1970s, women’s groups insisted
that reproductive decision making constituted private behavior. In the process,
Paul argues, they also undercut one of the premises most deeply held by
many eugenicists – that the state should play a central role in guarding the
nation’s germplasm, and thus in regulating reproduction. “Until then,” Paul
writes, “it was taken for granted that society had a legitimate interest in who
reproduced. By the mid-1970s, it was equally taken for granted that society
had no interest in the matter” (p. 129). It was this sea change in political
thinking, she shows, that sounded the death knell for the use of the term
“eugenics” – a term that had survived, albeit in a redefined form, into the
1960s. In elucidating such changes, Paul has produced a subtle history of
eugenics that also raises provocative questions about the broader relationship
between scientific developments and political culture.
The multiple meanings of eugenics is equally central to Marouf A. Hasian,
Jr.’s study, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought. A professor
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of rhetoric and communications, Hasian offers a postmodern analysis of
eugenics discourse. Occasionally, the terminology used to introduce this
analysis seems to obscure rather than to clarify his presentation. Clearly valuable, however, are Hasian’s careful efforts to trace the wide range of English
and American arguments both for and against eugenics. The “most popular
forms of eugenics,” he concludes, “were not always the hard-line tales constructed by people like Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, Harry Laughlin, and
Charles Davenport” (p. 141). To prove this, his chapters closely analyze the
arguments produced by African Americans, women, Catholics, and liberals
and socialists. Such a strategy proves more successful in some chapters than
others, for at times the author seems to struggle with the task of organizing
so much diverse data into cogent arguments. Still, the very rich material
analyzed by Hasian adds several new dimensions to our understanding of
the multiplicity of responses to eugenic science.
Hasian’s chapter on Catholic responses is particularly insightful. Eugenicists and Catholics are usually portrayed as enemies, largely because of the
church’s intense opposition to sterilization. Hasian too sees much eugenics
rhetoric as anti-Catholic. Yet his analysis is far more nuanced, for he shows
how Catholic intellectuals often challenged, co-opted, or redefined the very
meaning of “eugenics.” According to some, it was the Catholic commitment to social welfare and its opposition to “antieugenical acts of gluttony,
drunkenness, intemperance, idleness, bad company and neglect of prayer”
(p. 97) that would truly improve the race. Others contrasted “the eugenics of
the Galton school and the eugenics of the Catholic Church” or advocated a
“supernatural eugenics” (p. 96). “To pass over war and social injustice in the
hope of eradicating human ills by sterilization may be good propaganda,” one
Catholic critic argued, but “certainly it is bad eugenics” (p. 111).
Equally intriguing is Hasian’s summary of African-American responses.
While the role played by black intellectuals in battling scientific racism has
been widely documented, Hasian’s arguments go further, for he suggests that
in the decades that witnessed the emergence of the “New Negro” and the
“talented tenth,” a science promising “race betterment” could appeal to black
as well as white reformers. Thus, a 1924 article on “Applied Eugenics” in
the NAACP journal The Crisis saw this science as “interested in breeding
for tomorrow a better negro. One more anxious, more capable, and more
courageous to assume a larger share of our economic, political and social
responsibilities” (p. 64). Black responses too could divide along class lines.
Even more complex were reactions to birth control. To some, a rising black
birthrate was a welcome sign of survival despite intense discrimination (and
a refutation of racist predictions that their race was doomed); to others, it
meant that large black families were more likely to remain poor. In sum, for
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black leaders attempting to fight white racism while elevating their own race,
eugenics could prove a double-edged sword. By incorporating these stories
into the larger narrative of eugenics history, Hasian’s text significantly
expands our understanding of both the appeal and the dangers inherent in
this movement.
Both Hasian and Paul conclude by exploring the relevance of this past
for contemporary medical genetics. In new screening procedures, both see a
potential for covert social coercion, notwithstanding the modern lexicon of
“choice,” particularly in an era of state and medical cost cutting. Hasian fears
the Human Genome Project could lead to “a return visit by a revised form of
eugenics that is just beginning to be critiqued” (p. 137). Paul elaborates an
even more subtle relationship between past and present, for the very word
“eugenics” now “carries ominous connotations” and “packs a powerful
emotional punch” (p. 4). As a result, history itself has become “a weapon in a
war over social policy” (p. 134). If she is correct, then the task of explicating
just what this history means takes on an added importance. Both of these texts
contribute significantly to that task.
Leila Zenderland

Henry Harris, The Cells of the Body: A History of Somatic Cell Genetics
(Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 1995), ix
+ 263 pp., illus., $59.00, $29.00 (paper).
Henry Harris, a major figure in somatic cell genetics and one of its current
elder statesmen, has written an account of his field that is encyclopedic in
scope and balanced in its viewpoint. The genetic behavior of somatic cells,
first studied in laboratory cultures and more recently in whole organisms, is a
relatively recent affair. The nongerm cells of the body have long been recognized as having fundamental genetic behaviors, that is, like begets like (more
or less). But in contrast to the overt sexual behavior of the germ cells,
the genetic functions and potentials of the somatic cells of multicellular
organisms were not recognized and understood until rather complex and
sophisticated laboratory manipulations were applied to their study.
Sir Henry Harris, Regius Professor of Medicine, Emeritus, at Oxford,
describes the various strands of research that have contributed to our current
views of the genetic behavior of somatic cells. Harris casts his net widely and
brings together genetic, embryological, and biochemical traditions to show
their roles in the development of somatic cell genetics. His review of the
early literature, “Somatic Cells as Genetic Units” (chapter 1), is especially
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useful to remind modern readers of the long history of this problem. In contrast to the carefully explained and documented early history of this field, the
descriptions of some of the more recent science are too sketchy to do more
than signal to the reader that Harris recognizes the interdisciplinary nature
of his field. These topics – collected in chapter 6, “Somatic Cell Genetics
and Molecular Biology Come Together” – such as nucleic acid renaturation,
RNA sequence analysis, and the discovery of restriction endonucleases, for
example, are too brief and cryptic to be of much use, except to someone who
already knows the field quite well.
This book should please scientists, who will find Harris’s synthesis a
comforting validation of their favorite research work as important to somatic
cell genetics. Cell biology, bacterial genetics, radiation biology, carcinogenesis . . . all are important in this story. Historians, however, will find the
work useful mainly as a compendium of “findings.” Analysis of controversy,
motivation for specific research problems, reasons for changes in direction
. . . all are absent or only briefly mentioned. Sadly, The Cells of the Body
succumbs to the “annual review” syndrome and frequently reads like a list
of conclusions: “scientist A showed fact B and then scientist X showed fact
Y.” Anticipation and priority are important issues in Harris’s account of his
field. But The Cells of the Body is important precisely because it represents
the perspectives and judgments of one of its major participants. With rare
exception, it is only the insiders who know the literature so well. Indeed,
accounts such as this may be the only way for the more detached and
analytical historian to obtain a truly “insider” viewpoint.
William C. Summers

Anne Harrington, Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from
Wilhelm II to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), xxiv +
309 pp., ills., $39.50.
There has been a tendency in science over the past two decades to obviate
the question of the internal and the external by approaching the subject of
science and culture as just that, a single subject. Without reducing science to
culture or ignoring the context of science altogether, a handful of histories
of science have detailed the circular patterns of causation, in which culture
influences, and is influenced by, science. Reenchanted Science accordingly
makes a valuable contribution to this effort and to the history of biology,
specifically the history of the life sciences in Germany, with its examination
of holism in German biology and culture during the Wilhelmine and Weimar
eras.
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Drawing its title from a 1918 speech given by the sociologist Max Weber
at the University of Munich, Reenchanted Science turns on the differing conceptions of the ends and means of the natural sciences in German culture.
Particularly after World War I, Germans looked to science to make sense
of an increasingly disturbing modern world. According to Weber, however, science actually worked “to undermine all transcendent principles,
systematically stripping the world of all spiritual mystery, emotional color,
and ethical significance and turning it into a mere ‘causal mechanism’ ”
(p. xvi). Mechanistic Newtonian science, in the eyes of its critics, stripped
the world of enchantment, of qualities like art and beauty that made life
worth living. Reenchanted Science thus tells the story of a group of Germanspeaking life scientists who, although they agreed with Weber that science
had dis-enchanted the world, nonetheless argued that science could present an
existentially meaningful picture of the world if epistemological and methodological changes were made. Under the banner of holism, these biologists and
psychologists – scientists of life and the spirit – tried to restore a nurturing
role to the sciences and, in so doing, to reenchant the world. Harrington
convincingly demonstrates that biology and psychology, when interpreted
holistically, also wielded a unique authority within the discussion of holism
because these subjects studied phenomena that served as special symbols of
hope and regeneration to German culture.
This holistic approach, which saw the natural order and the cultural order
as essentially the same, opposed itself explicitly to the mechanistic epistemology embodied by the metaphor of the Machine. The Machine represented
the threat that industrialization, urbanization, and modernization was thought
to pose to all facets of German culture. According to Harrington, the Machine
was best understood as an emotionally charged image that nonetheless
possessed a certain reality. Mechanism had become associated with a number
of high-stakes issues as German culture modernized, and both “holism” and
“mechanism” had become the center of whole clusters of images and feelings.
Drawing from a wealth of primary printed and archival sources,
Harrington teases out the dynamic interaction between holism and biology by
paying attention not only to what biologists said, but how they said it through
a careful attention to language. Metaphors allow Harrington to argue that
German holistic science played an integral role in German cultural history,
and to demonstrate “how the conceptual ‘content’ of holistic life . . . science
was also its cultural ‘context’ ” (p. xxiii) without reducing one to the other.
Illuminating metaphors, such as that of the Machine, allowed these biologists
to “leapfrog in a range of ways across the epistemological divisions that an
earlier generation of science had declared must separate” (p. xix) the natural
and cultural orders. Harrington makes the astute observation that the adoption
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of such culturally laden metaphors constituted a means for science to ignore
a distinction its practitioners vigorously defended in their self-representation:
nature versus culture, fact versus value.
This metaphor-mediated porousness to the identity of culture and nature,
however, contributed to the co-optation of holistic biological discourse by
the Nazis. Harrington does an excellent job of detailing this process and
emphasizing that although holism was not synonymous with Nazified nature,
metaphoric translations contributed to it through two tragic identifications.
Both Jews and the sick were represented as part of the Machine and, as such,
were held antithetical to life. Yet Harrington raises an important point, specifically that holism was not synonymous to National Socialism: the holistic
and vitalistic embryologist Hans Driesch was emphatic in his opposition to
the Nazis, and attempted to harness holism to the service of pacifism and
humanism.
One concern with the book is the role of the thought of Kant in the holismmechanism debate. While holists, drawing on Kant, claimed that mechanistic
causality could not explain nature, mechanists, also drawing on Kant, claimed
that mechanistic causality, as it originated in living minds, was adequate.
This tension does not appear to be adequately resolved because only the
Kantian influences on holism are addressed. While Harrington’s analysis
of the Kantian elements of holism is strong in the beginning, it appears to
diminish toward the end. This Kantianism appears to be replaced by Goethean
antirationalism, although the transition is unclear. Perhaps Kant’s thought
provided a fund of metaphors deep enough to accommodate whatever was
sought for.
Throughout her book, Harrington skillfully interweaves cultural and
biological concerns, and demonstrates that they were, in effect, the same.
Reenchanted Science represents a valuable resource for students of the history
of biology and psychology, German science, and early-twentieth-century
German culture.
Christopher S. W. Koehler

Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, trans. Sarah Lucille
Bonnefoi, ed. L. Pearce Williams (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997),
xviii + 492 pp., illus., $49.95.
At the time of his death in 1990, Jacques Roger was the leading authority on
Buffon. For almost forty years he had published works on Buffon, and, more
than anyone else, he was responsible for renewing interest in this leading
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naturalist of the Enlightenment and major figure in the history of biology.
Roger’s publications on Buffon include a coedited scholarly bibliography (in
Jean Piveteau’s Oeuvres Philosophiques de Buffon, 1954), a critical edition of
Les Époques de la nature (in the Mémoires du Muséum National d’Histoire
Naturelle, 1962), and fifty-seven pages on Buffon’s theory of generation in
his magisterial study of eighteenth-century ideas on animal generation (Les
sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIIIe siècle, 1963. This work
has just been translated and is, at last, available to a wider audience). Fortunately for the scholarly world, Roger published his biography in the year before
he died, or, as has been the case with some scholars who have devoted decades
of study to mastering the life’s work of a major scientific figure but never
published their long-awaited final word, his mature overview might have been
lost.
Roger’s task was not easy. Relatively few of Buffon’s letters survive, and
he destroyed most of his manuscripts, preferring to leave his polished publications for future generations to judge. His family life was private, his daughter
died in childhood, and his only son was executed during the Revolution. Even
the location of the portrait of his wife is unknown. No Darwin industry is
possible with such scant manuscript resources. But Buffon was a prolific
writer, and his thirty-six-volume Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière
(1749–1789) contains a wide range of subjects from essays on methodology
to speculations on the formation of the earth. Roger had to concentrate on
Buffon’s writings, and this biography, therefore, is an intellectual biography.
All the known facts of Buffon’s life are in the book, as is the little we know
about his relationships. But even there, much has had to be reconstructed from
bits and pieces of evidence.
Roger has compensated for the incomplete record by carefully reading
Buffon’s work and providing insightful analyses that are placed in the context of the major themes of eighteenth-century science and philosophy. He
provides background sketches on the growth of the mechanical philosophy
in the seventeenth century and the theological interpretations given to it.
Buffon’s secular philosophy of nature is then contrasted with the natural theology of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. The overwhelming
bulk of Buffon’s work consists of individual articles on specific animals.
Roger focuses attention on the more philosophical essays that are found
primarily in the opening volumes of Buffon’s natural history and selects from
the individual articles on animals sections that contain reflective or theoretical
passages.
Separate chapters examine Buffon’s ideas on method, his theory of the
earth, theory on generation, natural history of man, classification, the order
of nature, and definitions of basic terms like “species.” Roger is at his best

300

THE J. H. B. BOOKSELF

at explicating the complex ideas that inform Buffon’s natural history. Buffon
may have been one of the members of the Académie Française, but he was not
a systematic philosopher. Some of his ideas were sketchy, and Roger provides
the reader with consistent and intelligent interpretations.
Roger’s biography sticks closely to the text. Buffon’s writings are placed
in the context of eighteenth-century science and philosophy, but there is little
of the wider context, his influence, or his ideas as a reflection of his time. But
that is for other scholars to fill in. Roger has given the reader a rich survey
of Buffon’s major ideas. Sarah Bonnefoi’s translation is accurate and faithful
to the original, and the editor, L. Pearce Williams, provides helpful notes for
the reader. The biography is a valuable addition to the secondary literature in
the history of the life sciences, and it should help expand the reputation of a
major figure who is still relatively little known in the English-speaking world.
Paul Lawrence Farber

Keir B. Sterling, Richard P. Harmond, George A. Cevasco, and Lorne
F. Hammond, eds., Biographical Dictionary of American and Canadian
Naturalists and Environmentalists (Westport, Conn., and London: Greenwood Press, 1997), xix + 937 pp. $175.00.
Robert L. Burgess, “American Ecologists: A Biographical Bibliography,”
Huntia: A Journal of Botanical History 10, no. 1 (1996): 5–116. $60.00.
I might as well admit it up front: I have long been a fan of wellconstructed reference works. Most of us discover early on how useful the
right bibliography, biographical dictionary, index, or encyclopedia can be.
And although we all depend on various reference materials to conduct our
research, rarely do we grant the scholars who create them the recognition
they deserve. Historians of biology – especially those whose interests center
on developments in North American natural history, ecology, conservation,
and/or environmentalism – clearly owe a debt of gratitude to the authors of
these two excellent compilations.
The larger of the two works, a biographical dictionary of “American and
Canadian naturalists and environmentalists,” provides personal and professional information on some 445 “representative” figures who were active
from the colonial period to 1996. In making selections about coverage, the
editors have widely chosen to cast their net broadly. Included are biographical sketches not only of explorers, artists, writers, and conservationists but
also of naturalists, ecologists, biogeographers, and others who have collected,
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described, mapped, cataloged, or worked to protect various components of the
North American landscape. Commercial natural history is the only activity
not adequately represented in this expansive and generally well-chosen
sample, although in fairness to the editors it should be mentioned that this
occupation has only begun to gain the scholarly attention it deserves. During
the late nineteenth century, dealers in specimens and supplies – entrepreneurs like Henry A. Ward and Frank B. Webster – played a crucial role in
the American natural history community, serving as conduits of information
and specimens, providing encouragement to budding young naturalists, and
offering employment opportunities at a time when jobs in natural history
were few and far between. Yet neither Ward nor Webster receives an entry
in this otherwise comprehensive dictionary. (Ward is briefly mentioned in
the sketches of William T. Hornaday and William Morton Wheeler, two
of the many naturalists who went on to distinguished careers in museums,
zoological parks, academic institutions, and private businesses after serving
apprenticeships at Ward’s Natural Science Establishment in Rochester, N.Y.)
The entries are concise and follow an easy-to-use format. Chronicled for
each individual covered in the dictionary are the date and location of birth and
death, family and educational background, an overview of career and major
contributions, and a list of bibliographical sources. Many entries also include
an indication of relevant manuscript collections, although the authors and
editors have not always been consistent in supplying this information (e.g.,
the entry for William Brewster fails to mention his voluminous collection of
papers preserved in the Museum of Comparative Zoology Special Collections
at Harvard). Also missing are specific page numbers for many of the articles
cited in the bibliographical sources. These problems are minor, though, when
compared to the amount of useful information packed into this exceptionally
handy volume.
Robert Burgess’s “biographical bibliography” of American ecologists is
much more modest in scope but also quite useful. First published in a much
shorter version in 1981, Burgess has now expanded his bibliography to cover
about 575 ecologists and more than 2,400 citations. The primary criterion
for inclusion is affiliation with the Ecological Society of America, founded
in 1915, although the compiler does provide references for “a few foreign
scientists” who had obituaries or other biographical information published in
ESA journals. He also includes a handful of figures who exerted an important
“early influence on the development of American ecology” (p. 6) before the
establishment of the ESA (e.g., he cites C. Hart Merriam and Charles E.
Bessey, but not George Perkins Marsh). The bibliography is rendered more
useful by the occasional addition of brief annotations (most often indicating
the location of published portraits or photographs) and by the decision to
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include entries on living ecologists (although the information available on
these scientists is often quite sketchy). The references cited range from short
notices of awards and deaths to book-length biographies.
The two works complement each other nicely, even though many entries
appear in both. When there is overlap, Burgess invariably cites more bibliographical references. Yet, because the Sterling, Harmond, Cevasco, and
Hammond volume provides self-contained biographical sketches for each of
its entries, it is generally more convenient than Burgess’s bibliography. While
the price of these volumes will undoubtedly dissuade some historians from
purchasing them for their own private use, both should be included in every
major research library. They represent valuable additions to the tool kit available to historians of ecology and natural history, environmental historians,
and anyone else interested in the development of scientific accounts of the
North American landscape.
Mark V. Barrow, Jr.

